Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 3 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 7

January 2009

SEC v. Talbot: The "Misappropriation-Plus" Theory
Kalina Laleva

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kalina Laleva, SEC v. Talbot: The "Misappropriation-Plus" Theory, 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (2009).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Laleva: The "Misappropriation-Plus" Theory

CASE SUMMARY

SEC V. TALBOT. THE
"MISAPPROPRIATION-PLUS"
THEORY
INTRODUCTION

On April 22, 2003, Thomas Talbot, a businessman, attorney, and
member of the board of directors of Fidelity National Financial, attended
a board meeting. During that meeting, he learned that LendingTree, a
company in which Fidelity owned an approximate 10% interest, was
potentially going to be sold at a significant premium.! Fidelity's vice
president, who had acquired the infonnation from LendingTree's CEO,
considered the infonnation confidential; he then relayed the infonnation
to Fidelity's CEO, who presented the infonnation at the April 22 Fidelity
board meeting. 2 Fidelity's CEO did not tell the board that the
infonnation was confidential; however, all other board members present
at the meeting considered it confidential. 3 Mr. Talbot, on the other hand,
attributed no confidentiality to the discussion, believing that the
infonnation of the sale was only a "rumor" and not a "factual
statement.,,4
After the meeting, LendingTree sent Fidelity a
confidentiality agreement that restricted the use of the infonnation by
Fidelity's officers, directors and employees, but Fidelity did not infonn
its directors of the agreement. 5
Two days after the meeting, Mr. Talbot purchased 5,000
LendingTree shares on margin, at approximately $13.50 per share, for a
I Fidelity stood to make about $50 million from the transaction. SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d
1085,1087-88 (9thCir. 2008).
2 Id. at 1088.
3 Id.
4 Id.
SId. at 1089.
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total of $67,SOO.6 Mr. Talbot continued to monitor LendingTree's stock,
and on April 30, 2003, he purchased an additionalS,OOO shares at $14.S0
per share for $72,SOO, bringing Mr. Talbot's total investment in
LendingTree to $140,000 within eight days of hearing the alleged
"rumor."7 Upon the approval of the acquisition of LendingTree on May
S, 2003, the company's stock price rose about 41%. Mr. Talbot
immediately sold all his shares for a profit of almost $68,000. 8
Subsequently the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission") brought an action against Mr. Talbot, alleging that he
violated Section lOb and Rule 10b-S of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") by trading on material, nonpublic
information. 9
I. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 108 AND RULE 108-S

Congress passed the Exchange Act in response to the stock market
crash of 1929,10 creating the Commission. l1 Section 10b l2 gave the
Commission the authority to regulate fraudulent practices used in
securities transactions. 13 In 1942, the Commission adopted Rule IOb-S
to prevent a company's president from buying shares from shareholders
at a low price by misrepresenting the company's fmancial condition. 14
The language of Rule IOb-S I5 was originally intended to help the

6

Id. at 1088.

7 Id.

BId.
9

Id. at 1089.

10 See

United States v. Nafialin, 441 U.S. 768,775 (1979).
IS U.S.C.A. § 78d (Westlaw 2009).
12 Section lOb states as follows:
11

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange ... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (Westlaw 2009). See Thomas Hazen, Fundamentals of Securities Law, The
Jurisprudence of SEC Rule JOb-5, SNOl8 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 539, 541 (2008) (explaining that Section
lOb of the Exchange Act is a catch-all provision, which by its terms did not make any act unlawful
unless the Commission adopted a rule prohibiting it).
13 See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section JOb of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REv. 385,388 n.20 (1990).
14 See Hazen, supra note 12, at 541.
15 Rule IOb-5 states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
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government in the prosecution of securities fraud. 16
In the 1960s and early 1970s, federal appellate and district courts
extended Rule IOb-5's application to a private right of action.17 The
Supreme Court further expanded the Rule by giving broad meanings to
the tenns "fraud,,,18 "purchase or sale,,,19 and "connection.,,20 However,
from 1975 to the present day, a more conservative Supreme Court has
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (LEXIS 2009). See Hazen, supra note 12, at 541 (citing Remarks of Milton
Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 891 (1967) (the
language of Rule IOb-5 followed the language of Section 17(a)(\) by adding the words "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security," and while Section 17(a)(\) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933 prohibited fraud and misstatements in the sale of securities, there was no
comparable provision prohibiting such practices in connection with the purchase of securities.».
16 See Hazen, supra note 12, at 541 (the private causes of action included liability for
negligent and deliberate misrepresentations, for corporate management's breaches of fiduciary duty,
and for failure by directors, underwriters, accountants and lawyers to prevent wrongdoing by
others.); see also Remarks of Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 891, 922 (\967) (At a conference in the late 1960s, Milton Freeman described
the origin of Rule IOb-5: "I never thought that twenty-odd years later it would be the biggest thing
that had ever happened. It was intended to give the Commission power to deal with this problem
[prosecution of securities fraud). It had no relation in the Commission's contemplation to private
proceedings. ").
17 See Hazen, supra note 12, at 54\.
18 See Superintendent of Ins. of State of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, II
(1971) (citing with approval A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967), for the
proposition that it was not "sound to dismiss a complaint merely because the alleged scheme does
not involve the type of fraud that is 'usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities,'" and
that "Section I O(b) and Rule IOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present
a unique form of deception"); SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (\ 969) ("Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 together constitute one of the several broad anti-fraud provisions contained in the
securities laws."); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (stating
that Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be
construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes").
19 See SEC v. Nat'l Sec., 393 U.S. at 467 (where shareholders of acquired insurance
company were allegedly misled prior to their approval of merger, the shareholders of the acquired
company were considered to have "purchased" shares in new company by exchanging them for their
old stock and antifraud provisions of securities laws respecting misstatements in connection with
"purchase or sale" of any security were applicable).
20 Id. at 468 (holding that "full disclosure in connection with the solicitation of proxies" faIls
within the requirement of Section 1O(b), which "applies to all proscribed conduct in connection with
a purchase or sale of any security"); see also Hazen, supra note 12, at 541 (for the general
proposition of the expansion of the meaning of these terms by the Supreme Court).
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generally reversed this trend through a more narrow reading of the tenns
of Rule 10b-S. 21
II. LIABILITY UNDER SECTION lOB AND RULE 10B-S
Section lOb and Rule 10b-S regulate "classical" insider trading. 22
Under the classical insider trading theory, Section lOb and Rule 10b-S
prohibit a corporate insider from trading in the securities of his or her
corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic infonnation. 23 Classic
insiders include officers, directors, and other pennanent insiders of a
corporation, as well as attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others
who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation. 24 However,
liability initially did not reach an outsider who owed no fiduciary
relationship to the corporation in whose shares he or she traded. 25 The
Supreme Court addressed this issue by creating a complementary theory
of liability - the "misappropriation" theory - that reaches corporate
outsiders who owe no duty to the investors with whom they trade. 26
Under the misappropriation theory, liability is generated from "a
fiduciary-tumed-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with
access to confidential infonnation.'.27 Specifically, in United States v.
o 'Hagan, the Supreme Court recognized the "misappropriation theory"
of liability under Section lOb and Rule 10b-S, when a trader
misappropriates infonnation in breach of a duty owed to the source of the

21 Id.; see Hazen, supra note 12, at 541 ("In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court in a
series of cases limited the scope of the private right of action under Rule IOb-5; this trend carried
through the end of the century."); see. e.g.. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 51 I U.S. 164, 191
(\ 994) (eliminating the implied private right of action imposed through aiding and abetting liability
under Rule IOb-5); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361-62
(\ 991) (adopting a statute of limitations of one year after discovery and no longer than three years
after the violation for section lOb actions, effectively shortening the statute of limitations); Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that absent a duty to disclose based on a
fiduciary or similar relationship, silence does not give rise to liability); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring that scienter be shown in section lOb private actions).
22 SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1090-91 (9thCir. 2008).
23 Id. at 1091 (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (\997».
24 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (\ 983».
2S Id.; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (holding that there can be no duty to disclose in
situations where the person who had traded on inside information was not the corporation's agent, a
fiduciary, or a person in whom the sellers of the securities have placed their trust and confidence);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980) (holding that an employee for a financial printer
who traded on information learned through his job was not guilty of insider trading because the
printer and the employee were not classic insiders and had no duty of trust to the company in whose
stock the employee traded).
26 Talbot, 530 F.3d at 1091(citing O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52).
27 /d .
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information. 28 In that case, the defendant was a partner in a law firm that
represented Grand Metropolitan PLC in connection with a potential
tender offer for the Pillsbury Company's common stock. 29 Even though
the defendant did not work on the matter, he used the information
received in his partnership capacity at the firm to purchase and sell
Pillsbury Company's securities for about $4.3 million. 30 The Supreme
Court found that because the defendant failed to disclose his trading of
Pillsbury stocks to Grand Metropolitan and to his law firm, his conduct
was deceptive within the meaning of Section 10b. 3! Thus, the Supreme
Court held that the misappropriation theory may reach beyond corporate
insiders to impose liability for trading by corporate outsiders as well. 32
III. SEC V. TALBOT'S PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In SEC v. Talbot, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Talbot. 33 The
court held that Mr. Talbot could be liable under the 0 'Hagan
misappropriation theory only if he or Fidelity owed a fiduciary duty of
confidentiality to LendingTree as the "originating source" of the
information on which Mr. Talbot traded. 34 It determined that it was not
enough that Fidelity was the information's "immediate source.,,35
According to the district court, Mr. Talbot was not liable for his actions
without a continuous chain of fiduciary relationships between Fidelity,
Mr. Talbot and LendingTree. 36 The district court also denied the SEC's
motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact as
to the materiality of the information on which Mr. Talbot traded.37

IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS IN SEC V. TALBOT
On appeal from the summary judgment in favor of Mr. Talbot, a
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's
decision, holding that Mr. Talbot could be liable under the

O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
O'Hagan, 521 U.s. at 647.
30 1d. at 647-48.
31 Id. at 660.
32 Id. at 652.
33 SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008).
28

29

34

Id.

35

Id. at \089-90.

36 1d.
37

at 1090.

1d.
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"misappropriation" theory, and not as an insider at Fidelity.38 The court
held that in order for Mr. Talbot to be liable, the SEC needed to
demonstrate that Talbot (1) knowingly misappropriated confidential
material and nonpublic information (2) for securities trading purposes,
(3) in breach of a duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence
owed to the source of the information at issue (as opposed to a duty owed
to the corporation whose stock he traded).39
No party challenged the fact that the information was nonpublic, or
that Mr. Talbot knowingly used the information to trade in securities.
Therefore, the SEC only needed to prove that Mr. Talbot breached a
fiduciary duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence owed to
the source of the information, and that the information he traded on was
materia1. 40 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the SEC's contention that Mr.
Talbot owed a duty to Fidelity to keep the information about
LendingTree's transaction confidential, and that he breached his duty by
trading securities for personal profit. 41 However, the Ninth Circuit found
that the district court had misinterpreted 0 'Hagan by requiring a
continuous chain of fiduciary duties linking the trader to the original
source of the inside information in order for the misappropriation theory
to apply.42 The Ninth Circuit declined to "read an 'originating source'
requirement into 0 'Hagan" and held that Mr. Talbot could be liable
based on a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the company where he was a
director. 43
The Ninth Circuit stated that its interpretation of 0 'Hagan as not
including an "originating source" requirement is confirmed by United
States v. Carpenter. 44 In Carpenter, the employee breached his duty to
his employer, the immediate source of the information on which his
tippees traded. 45 The Second Circuit, later affirmed by an evenly divided
Supreme Court, rejected the argument that the employee needed to have
breached a duty to the corporation or shareholders of the corporation
whose stocks the tippees had purchased or sold on the basis of the
information, and held it was enough that the employee breached a duty to

Id. at 1098.
1d. at 1092 (citing SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990)).
40 [d.
38

39

41

[d.

42

[d. at 1093.

43

[d.

44 [d. at 1094; see United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), ajJ'd by an
evenly divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
4S See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026, 1029.
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his employer as the immediate source of the information. 46 Similarly, in
this case, Mr. Talbot, as a member of Fidelity's board of directors, owed
a duty arising from his relationship of trust and confidence to Fidelity,
the immediate source and owner of the information. 47 Moreover, the
information was confidential as property '''entrusted' to him by Fidelity
in his capacity as a Fidelity director,'048 and thus, Mr. Talbot had
committed a "textbook misappropriation. ,,49
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Mr. Talbot's contention that no
reasonable factfinder could find that Mr. Talbot was obligated to keep
the LendingTree information confidential. 50 The court found that Mr.
Talbot's conduct fell within 0 'Hagan's theory of liability. 5I
In
o 'Hagan, the partner of the law firm was in a relationship of trust and
confidence with his firm; here, Mr. Talbot, as a member of Fidelity's
Board, was in a similar relationship with Fidelity.52 The Ninth Circuit
found support for this conclusion in Delaware case law, as well as in
common sense. 53
The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with Mr. Talbot's contention that,
because Fidelity did not indicate that the information was confidential,
he reasonably believed the information on which he traded was only a
"rumor.,,54 The court found the information confidential as a matter of

46

ld.

Talbot, 530 F.3d at \094.
ld.
49 ld..
so Id.

47
48

!d. at 1095.
s2 Id.

51

s3 Id. (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and
directors are not pennitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests.")); see also Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1963); Boyer v. Wilmington
Materials, Inc., 754 A.2d 881, 907 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("[D]irectors of corporations organized under
Delaware law owe a fiduciary duty to the corporations upon whose boards they serve and to the
stockholders of those corporations.") (internal quotations marks and citation omitted);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to
a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the
principal or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency or in violation of his
duties as agent, in competition with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or on behalf
of another, although such infonnation does not relate to the transaction in which he is then
employed, unless the infonnation is a matter of general knowledge."); WILLIAM E. KNEpPER & DAN
A. BAILEY, I LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 4-23 (7th ed. 2007) ("A
corporation is entitled to keep confidential information obtained and assembled in the course of
conducting its business. Such infonnation is a type of property to which the corporation has an
exclusive right. A director has a duty to use reasonable diligence to protect and safeguard his
corporation's property, and he may not use it in his own personal interests, even if he or she causes
no injury to the corporation.") (footnotes omitted).
54 Talbot, 530 F.3d at 1095.
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law. 55 It pointed to the fact that Fidelity's CEO announced the
information at a meeting of the Board, and "not in a passing reference to
a company in which Fidelity had no interest.,,56 Because of the
discussion of the transaction and the weight of the subject matter, the
court considered it improbable that someone with thirty years of
experience on different boards of directors would not realize that this
was confidential information not to be used for personal gain. 57
Moreover, the court found it significant that all the other directors
present at the meeting considered the information confidential. 58
Rather than granting judgment as a matter of law, however, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision,
because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
information Mr. Talbot traded on was material. 59 The court of appeals
considered whether there was an increase in the stock price after the
merger's public announcement, whether the information came from an
insider or someone else, and whether the potential acquisition was
accompanied by some specific qualifications and certainty.60 The court
remanded this issue because it could find facts both for and against a
finding that the information was material. 61
On one hand, two directors perceived the acquisition to be at an
advanced stage, Mr. Talbot purchased the LendingTree's stocks shortly
after the meeting, and Mr. Talbot sold all the stocks that he owned after
the stock rose around 41 % upon the announcement of the acquisition. 62
The court found that these facts could support a finding that the
information was material. On the other hand, Mr. Talbot testified that he
considered the transaction to be just a rumor and not a factual statement,
and that there was no "definite description of the worth of the potential
acquisition," which might lead a jury to conclude that the information
was immaterial. 63 According to the Ninth Circuit, this conflicting
evidence as to the materiality of the information required remanding the
materiality issue to the district court. 64

55 [d.
56

[d. at 1095-96.
at 1096.

57 [d.
58

[d.

60

at 1097.
Id at 1097-98.

61

[d.

62

[d.

63

[d. at 1098.
[d.

59 [d.

64
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V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEC V. TALBOT
SEC v. Talbot expanded the scope of potential liability for
misappropriation of information used by board members and officers of
companies in the trading of stock, creating a "misappropriation-plus"
theory. Talbot also expanded the scope of the duty ofa company's noninsider to either disclose any material, non-public information about that
company learned through his position on the board of directors of a
different company, or else refrain from trading in that company's
securities. 65 The Ninth Circuit concluded that directors have a duty to
consider confidential all material, non-public information learned at a
board meeting because the company is "the rightful owner of the
information. ,,66
According to the court, this duty is breached when a director uses
the information for personal gain. 67 The company, however, does not
need to be harmed by the director's conduct in order for the director to be
liable. 68 This is because an injury to the trading public is produced by
the very act of deceiving the public concerning the source of the
information. 69 A non-insider's special access to information due to his or
her employment confers an advantage over the general public that results
in a diminished public perception of the integrity of the markets. 70
Moreover, for liability to attach, there is no need for the company on
whose board the director serves to have any duty, or even be aware of a
duty, to keep the information confidential. 71 The court concluded that
Mr. Talbot should have known that the information learned at the
meeting was confidential, based on his thirty years of experience, and he
should not have traded on it, even if he thought the information was
based only on rumors and not concrete facts. 72
This case serves as a warning sign for directors in the Ninth
6S

66

Id. at 1097.
Id.

Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1097.
69 Id.

67
68

70 Id. (citing Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for
Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 101, 123 (1984».
71 Id. at 1092 n.2 (the SEC did not prove that either Fidelity or Talbot owed any fiduciary
duty to LendingTree to keep the information confidential); see id. at 1088 (Fidelity was possibly
going to make $50 million from the increase of the stock price following the acquisition of
LendingTree, but Fidelity did not show intent to use the information in any other way). Talbot
allegedly considered the information to be only TUmors and not confidential. The Ninth Circuit
dismissed that argument based on his experience on different boards of directors and the discussions
of the possible acquisition of LendingTree. Id. at 1095.
72 [d. at 1096.
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Circuit's jurisdiction. 73 Specifically, this case should caution those
serving on boards of directors not to purchase the stock of any company
mentioned during the board's meetings, whether or not the company's
prospects are directly discussed or are mentioned only in passing, and it
could also discourage qualified business people from taking board
positions. 74 This is because under Talbot a director may be held liable
under "textbook" misappropriation theory75 for acting on information
that the director perceived as mere rumor or non-confidential
information. 76
VI. CONCLUSION

While Section lOb and Rule 10b-5 initially imposed liability only
for classic insider trading, liability has been expanded to include not only
the misappropriation theory, but also a "misappropriation-plus" theory.
It is hard to predict the implications of the Talbot decision - whether it
will deter non-insiders, and more importantly, members of boards of
directors. It might depend on whether the SEC decides to prosecute
more directors under this "misappropriation-plus" theory.
KALINA LALEVA*

73
74

75
76

See id. at 1092-97.
See id. at 1095-96.
Id. at 1094 (considering the misappropriation in Talbot a "textbook misappropriation").
See id. at 1096 .
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